

*Double Wrapped*

**\*ARMY review  
completed\***

10 August 1970

Mr. Ollon D. McCool  
Chief, Office Management Division  
Office of the Adjutant General  
Department of Army  
Washington, D.C. 20310

*(2 E-532 Pentagon)*

Dear Mr. McCool:

The attached five documents received with your request  
AGAR-S (70508) dated 10 June 1970 have been reviewed.

This Agency has no objection to the declassification  
and release of these documents to Major Peter B. Lane, USAF,  
to be used for his unofficial research project cited in  
your request.

Sincerely,

*151*

  
CIA Records Administration Officer

STATINTL

Attachments: As stated

Distribution:

Orig & 1 - Addressee

1 - OSS File ✓

1 - RAB

DDS/SSS/RAB/dd (10 Aug. 70)

STATINTL

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR  
STRATEGIC SERVICES UNIT



STATINTL

21 July 1970

STATINTL

MEMORANDUM FOR:



SUBJECT : Request from The Adjutant General's  
Office for Declassification of OSS  
Documents

REFERENCE : AGAR-S (70508)

1. Returned herewith are the documents from the Department of the Army which they have requested to be reviewed to determine if they can be declassified.

2. The Office of Security and the CI Staff have no objections to the declassification of these documents. Accordingly, the Strategic Services Unit authorizes you to advise the Department of the Army that the documents may be declassified and used for the purposes specified in their memorandum.

STATINTL



Attachments, A/S

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Approved For Release 2002/01/09 : CIA-RDP74-00390R000200030003-0

25 JUN 1970

*ID-4124, Hqs.*

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Strategic Services Unit

SUBJECT : Review and Declassification of OSS Documents

The Adjutant General's Office proposes to declassify and release notes taken by a Major Peter B. Lane, USAF from OSS originated documents. May I have your concurrence or comments on this request.



Acting  
Chief, Support Services Staff

Attachments:  
AGAR-S Memo (70508)  
6 pages OSS Notes


DDS/SSS/RAB/ [redacted] fms (23 June 1970)

Distribution:

- Orig & 1 - addressee
- 1 - SSS Subject
- 1 - SSS Chrono
- 1 - RAB Subject
- 1 - RAB Chrono

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**CONFIDENTIAL**



19 JUN 1970

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20315

AGAR-S (70508)

16 June 1970

25X1A

[REDACTED]  
Records Administration Officer  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D. C. 20505

25X1A

[REDACTED]  
Major Peter B. Lane, USAF, has been authorized to use classified Army records in connection with his unofficial research project tentatively entitled United States Policy in the Balkans from the Munich Crisis to Pear Harbor.

Among the notes taken by Major Lane from records of the former Military Intelligence Division are five which we believe should have your review prior to declassification. These are attached.

Notes 1 and 2 are taken from documents originated by the Office of Strategic Services. Note 3 is from a document attributed to the Coordinator of Information and notes 4 and 5 (two-pages) are from military attache reports which cite comments of Colonel Donovan. These presumably are references to William J. Donovan, who served successively as the Coordinator of Information and as Director, Office of Strategic Services. These last three notes are also being reviewed by the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence.

Request your comments on the declassification and release of attached notes to Major Lane.

Sincerely,

*Cyrus H. Fraker*

Inclosures

for OLLON D. McCOOL  
Chief, Office Management Division

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DOWNGRADED AT 10-YEAR INTERVALS:

NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

Approved For Release 2002/01/09 : CIA-RDP74-00390R000200030003-0

CLASSIFIED INCLOSURES

Sheet No: 9 Security Classification: Secret

Notes taken from the records of MB  
 Type of Document: OSS Intelligence Report Date: 25 July 42  
 File No. and Symbol: 3100 To:   
 From: OSS  
 Subject: The Visit of King Peter II of Yugoslavia in Retrospect

Americans of Serb, Croat, and Slovene descent keenly felt the loss of Yugoslavia. Maintained a united front, broken only by those American Croats -- extreme nationalists and some Pavlich agents and their dupes-- who were grouped around the Nezavisna Hrvatska Drzava (Independent Croat State), which has since been liquidated by the FBI. A Central Yugoslav - American Group was formed with headquarters in Chicago. Old conflicts never far from the surface but the main conflict centered about the blame for the swift downfall of the country - Serb generals of Croat traitors.

A 'Great Serbia' drive opened in the US just as--in November 1941 just as King Peter II arrived in this country on an official visit-- arrived June 21, 1942

Goes on to describe the King's visit

Fotic in bitter conflict with the Croat delegates

Refers to dissatisfaction of the Exile Govt in London with treatment of the British. Tend to take their case to the US

Action Office Comment:

**CONFIDENTIAL**  
 GROUP-3

Sheet No: 13 Security Classification Conf  
Notes taken from the records of WID  
Type of Document: oss Pamphlet of Foreign National Groups  
File No. and Symbol: 3800 Albania Date: 17 Jan 44  
From: To:  
Subject: A Survey of Albanian - American Politics

The Albanian American community comprised only some 4,000 in the 1940 Census.

Most of these to the US were from the Southern half of the country- the Christian area

Two main organizations vie for the support of the community

1. Fan-Albanian Federation (Vatra) founded in 1912- 500 members- official organ Dielli (The Sun), a weekly published in Boston- group centers around support for the monarchical regime of King Zog

2. A rival organization, Free Albania, was founded in 1941. It has proclaimed itself to be for a republic and has steadfastly opposed restoration of Zog to the Albanian throne.- 20 chapters and a membership of 1500. Its official organ is Liria (Liberty), a weekly published in Boston

Largest Albanian community outside of the country is in the US

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Action Office Comment:

Sheet No: 11

Security Classification ~~Secret~~

Notes taken from the records of MIL

Type of Document: Report

File No. and Symbol: 3330 Yugoslavia

Date: 2 May 42

From: Coordinator of Information

Subject: The American Slav Congress

Reports on the Slav Congress held in Detroit Apr 25-26, 1942

Stated purpose was to unite the American Slavs behind the war effort.

Pro-Soviet elements attempted to dominate the work but democratic element prevailed

Many differences among the groups

"It must be remembered that the political position of most Slavs in the United States is surrounded with considerable confusion and has often been misinterpreted. The rank and file do not follow any definite political ideology. Their old world loyalties are cultural rather than political. The leadership and control of the Slavs in the United States formerly was in the hands of Slav church groups." Now lost by the Church and small groups of political refugees try to work through the leaderless Slavs to win them over to their cause.

Communists active in this element.

Action Office Comment:

**CONFIDENTIAL**

GROUP-3

**CONFIDENTIAL**

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Approved For Release 2002/01/09 : CIA-RDP74-00390R000200030003-0

Security Classification Conf

Notes Taken From the Records of:

Type of Document:

File No. and Symbol: 2071-215-38

From: MA, Belgrade

Subject: Comments on Current Events

MID

Date: 24 Jan 41

No: G-2

Col <sup>D</sup>onovan interviewed the leading personalities of the Yu Armed Forces

Pesic- Declared half-heartedly that Yugoslavia would resist only if she was directly attacked. Stressed an attack on Britain but first Germany will seize Ireland. Getting old and did not exhibit the dynamic energy and will to resist.

Kosic- rather poor impression- floundering

Simovic- described how often the Yugoslav plans have changed due to the political situation. "General SIMOVIC was emphatic in his determination to resist any German infringement of Yugoslav territory. "People must learn from the lessons of Rumania. Particularly concerned with Salonika. Even insinuated that a joint Yugoslav attack against the Germans in Bulgaria and the Italians in Albania might succeed

MA amazed at the frankness of the Yugoslav responses. Now discusses the all important local question, "Will Yugoslavia permit passage of German troops through territory?" Still believes that it is in the German interest to leave Yugoslavia alone. If the Germans plan to attack Greece and/ or Turkey then the railroad lines running through Yugoslavia is essential. Can see no advantage at the present in a German attack on Russia. " It is therefore far more likely, either as a diversion or as an operation with limited or extended objectives, that the Germans will cross the Danube this Spring."

If Germany moves into Bulgaria, Yugoslavia must act. or any chance for a successful defense will vanish. Must act as the Germans attempt a water crossing into Bulgaria. British bombers must assist. Bulgaria will waver but will join the Allies as will Turkey. At this point a Balkan defense pact will have been created. "This plan is sound for a nation that desires to defend itself. There are men in the army who would gladly execute it. That the government would order it is still extremely doubtful. "

Thinks Yugoslavia will eventually capitulate like the others and grant the Germans use of the railroads. "There will be much sabotage against Germany by the Serbs. But the Government has seen to it that the nation be kept psychologically unprepared for the supreme effort. Unless the unexpected happens or a strong man takes over, the stage today is more apt to offer the performance 'Defeatism' than 'Fight'."

Action Office Comment

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NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED

DDP DIS 5700.10

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Note No 4



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Approved For Release 2002/07/09 : CIA-RDP74-00390R000200030003-0

Security Classification Secret

Notes Taken from the Records of:

MID

Type of Document: MA Rpt

File No. and Symbol: 2025-322-30

Date: 5 Feb 41

From: MA Ankara

To: G-2

Subject: Comments on Current Events

Sends extracts of Donovan's tel to Knox enclosed:

Reviews itinerary

Germany has offensive and defensive objectives in The region.

Gives standard interpretation of countries position. Again says that Yugoslavia will resist and not grant passage of German troops (misses the point)  
Thinks that Turkey will fight in other than an attack on its own territory (Wrong)

"Turkey is not ready for an offensive, but if supplied with modern equipment she would not hesitate" All the Balkan states believe that Britain must defeat Germany in the Balkans. This could be achieved in conjunction with other Balkan States not yet occupied by Germany. "

"What is needed is some outside impulse from a nation that has no interest. " England's part, to furnish technical service. Allies will not be ready for an offensive before 1942. "Initial success of such a movement might well draw Russian support. "

(D thinking far into the future while the threat was much more immediate- implies a possible union with R)

#### Comments by MA

Only limited contact with Donovan

Kluss briefly read his telegram and wisely disagreed with much of its content. Understood the relative power situation in the region and disagreed with the theory of establishing a successful front in the Balkans and thought any plan of defeating Germany in this way was "wishful thinking". Suggested an attack by Russia as the best alternative in conjunction with the Balkan States. "I also stated that in my opinion England would not be sufficiently strong in men, equipment and ships in the Mediterranean to operate successfully by way of the Balkans for some time to come." Germany operating on interior lines. "I told Donovan that I was of the opinion that any material assistance to Greece on the part of England would be used as an excuse to bring about another Norway affair. Donovan stated that Germany would experience considerable difficulty in any Balkan operation because of opposition and limited line of communication. " Replied that the British had the greater problem in this regard.

Kluss was of the opinion that any statements of implications that Turkey will come to the assistance of Greece in the event of the passage of German troops through Bulgaria en route to Salonika area are to be taken with a grain of salt.

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NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED

DO NOT RECLASSIFY

SECRET

Note No. 5 (page 1)

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25X1C

Interviewed the Turkish Chief of Staff

The Turk felt that Russia was the real key to a effective defense union i the Balkans through Salonika . Russia would only help if she felt t at Germany was losing the war.

"It is quite unusual for the Marshal to express his opinion to anyone. Colonel Donovan(s publecezed visit as the personal pepresentative of the President and t e trend of recent events in the Balkans undoubtedly caused the Marshal to loosed nis tongue."

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NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED

DDO DIR 5200.10

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Note No 5 (page 2)